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THE DOCTRINE OF DIVISIBLE CONTRACTS.
A very familiar contract, in these days of great commercial
enterprises, is one in which the engagement of at least one of
the parties is multiple in form. What is the effect of a default
in the performance of a single item in such a multiple engagement? May the party not in fault, in the absence of an
express condition, repudiate the contract so far as it is unperformed, or is he confined to his remedy in damages for the
breach? The question was early discovered by the courts to
be a somewhat difficult one, and apparently with the purpose
of establishing a guiding rule of construction, an endeavor has
been made to classify contracts of this kind as "entire" and
"divisible," or "entire" and "severable." That is to say, if
the contract in a particular case be construed as entire, the
violation by one party of one of the several parts or divisions
of his engagement is held to relieve the other party wholly
from his engagement under the contract, while if the contract
be construed as divisible, the other portions of the contract
remain unaffected and the party suffering from the breach is
confined to his action for damages.
It is submitted that the adoption of this classification, instead
of simplifying the problem, has resulted in considerable mis-
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apprehension and confusion. That such has been its effect,
however, is not surprising, when we consider the nature of the
classification and the method of its application. The principle
is fundamental, that whether the party suffering from a breach
of contract is justified in refusing further to perform his engagement,.or is confined to his action for damages, depends entirely
upon the character of the breach. If the term violated is one
the performance of which appears to have been regarded by
the parties at the time of making the contract as essential to
its continued existence as a binding agreement, further performance may legally be refused: if not, the obligation to
perform is unaffected. in every case this is the final test, and
whatever may be the form of the contract, its application is
uniform. To put it briefly, it is not the nature of the contract,
but the nature of the breach, that controls. In some of the
leading cases arising under contracts of the class under consideration, this distinction appears to have been kept 'Clearly
in mind, and the terms "entire contract" and "divisible contract" to have been used to describe a result rather than a
cause. That is to say, if the breach be of an essential term,
the contract is entire; if of a non-essential term, the contract
is divisible.' Even when the terms are used in this sense, the
classification is open to criticism. Thus, in two cases, involving contracts almost identical in terms, it may be found that
while in one the breach reaches the essence and the contract
is therefore entire, in the other the term violated is a nonessential term and the contract is therefore divisible. Indeed,
it is quite conceivable that in an action for breach of a nonessential term, a contrat might be found to be divisible, and
in a subsequent action fdr breach of a more important provision, the'same contract be declared to be entire. This is well
illustrated by the English decisions on instalment contracts of
sale, to be discussed at some length hereafter. Suffice it to
say at this point, that in an action for default in the engagement to deliver an infalment, the English courts, in effect,
hold such contracts to be entire1.'while in an action for default
'See Norrington v. Wright (1885), 115 U.UfS, I88.
2Hoare v. Rennie (1859), 5 H. & N. I9.
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in payment, they declare them to be divisible 1 And such
would also be the logical result, even though the same contract were involved in the two actions.
The existing confusion is chiefly attributable, however, to
the fact that many judges, apparently misled by the usage to
which we have referred, have seemed to think that the cases
turn upon the nature of the contract. And inasmuch, for
example, as all ordinary instalment contracts for the sale of
merchandise are substantially similar in character, it is obvivious, they appear to reason, that such contracts cannot in
one case be entire and in another divisible, but must always
be regarded as belonging either to one class or the other.
One of the consequences of this conclusion is that the leading
English authorities on instalment contracts are very commonly
regarded as being hopelessly in conflict, whereas we shall try
to show that the real disagreement among them is very slight.
Another consequence is that in many of the cases there
appears to be a tendency, more or less clearly evidenced by the
language of the opinions, to excuse a party suffering from a
breach from further performance, or confine him to his action
for damages, as the case may be, not because of the extent of
the breach or of the importance in the contemplation of the
parties of the term violated, but because the character of that
class of contracts, as entire or divisible, has been established
by prior authorities.
Aside from the difficulties already mentioned, which possibly are the natural results of the apparently unscientific nature
of the classification, there is one of less importance growing
out of its nomenclature. The terms "entire" and "divisible,"
"severable" or "separable," have come to be variously used,
and consequently to be more or less indefinite in meaning.
Thus they are frequently employed, and with entire propriety,
in distinguishing a contract in which full performance is a condition precedent to the payment of any part of the consideration, from one in which part of the consideration accrues upon
partial performance. Baker v. Higgins (I86o), 2 1 N. Y. 397,
affords a good illustration of this usage. In that case, under
IMersey

v. Naylor (1884), 9 App. Cases 434.
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a contract to "deliver 25,000 pale brick for $3 per M, and
5ooo hard brick at $4 per M cash," the plaintiff delivered
IO,5OO hard and 10,500 pale brick and then demanded payment for that quantity. The defendant refused to pay until
the entire quantity was delivered, contending that the brick
was not to be paid for as delivered, but only upon the complete performance of the contract. This the court held to be
the true import of the agreement, saying, "The contract was
entire, to deliver 75,ooo bricks, and the plaintiff was not entitled to pay for any part until the whole was delivered, or until
he was ready and offered to deliver the balance." I Obviously
a contract might be divisible in this use of the terms, while
entire in the sense that breach as to one item would excuse
further performance by the other party. The same nomenclature is employed again with reference to contracts called
in question because of illegality, in which case, of course, the
question is rather one of severability of subject-matter than of
intention of the parties.' Moreover, the term "divisible contract" is commonly applied to transactions involving several

distinct and entirely separate contracts, the courts in some
instances making no distinction between such several contracts
and a single so-called severable contract,3 and in others regard-

ing all transactions as entire contracts, except those which in
reality constitute several distinct and separate agreements.'
In view of what has been said, it is ventured to suggest that
much might be gained in the direction of simplicity and clearness:
First, by abandoning the use, in this connection, of the
terms "entire " and "divisible."
Second, by classifying the contracts under discussion as
' See also Gill v. Johnstown Lumber Co. (1892),. 151 Pa. 534; Note to
Chicagq E dison Co. (1897), 59 Am. St R . -277. The term

1 uyett' v.

a4portionable.", is.kised by Parsons in this connection, "divisible"

contracts being classified by him as apportionable or unapportionable.
See Parsons on Coitract (8th Ed.) VQL 2, p. 637.
'See Osgood v. Bander (WSS), 75 Iowa 550; Wooten v. Walters (1892),
i o N. C. 251; Anson on Cofitracts (Huffcut's Ed.) pp. 253-5.
2
See Gerli v. Poidebard Silk Co. (1895), 57 N. 3. L. 432 at 438; Parsons
on Contracts (8th Ed.), Vof. 2, p. 634, note.
'See Barrie v. Earle (1886), 143 Mass. i.
•9
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follows: (a) Unapportioned contract-one in which there is
an engagement consisting of several items or divisions for a
single and unapportioned consideration. (b) Apportioned
contract-one in which there is an engagement consisting of
several items or divisions for a single but apportioned consideration.
Third, by strictly confining the use of the foregoing classification to its proper purpose-that of description merely, so
that it may be clear in every case, whether of unapportioned
or apportioned contract, that the effect of a breach depends
not upon the nature of the contract involved, but upon the
character of the breach itself.
With these suggestions in mind, we have now to proceed to
the examination of some of the adjudged cases. At the
beginning, however, it is necessary carefully to distinguish the
case of a mere breach of one item from that of a breach
accompanied by such conduct on the part of the person committing it as amounts to an abandonment or renunciation of
the entire contract. What conduct is sufficient depends in
great measure, of course, upon the circumstances of each particular case, the general rule being that the circumstances
should be such as to give reasonable ground for believing
that the party in default does not intend to go on with the
contract.' Whether a refusal to perform, as distinguished from
a mere failure to do so, would be sufficient in all cases, may
perhaps fairly be doubted. But if such refusal is positive and
unqualified, the inference of an intention to renounce would
seem to be inevitable.2
It should also be borne in mind that the right to repudiate
because of a breach may be lost by waiver. As was pointed
out in Morgan v. McKee (1874), 77 Pa. 228, the election to
repudiate must be promptly communicated, and undue delay
'Withers v. Reynolds (x83i), 2 Barn. & Adol. 882; Bloomer v. Bernstein (1874), L. R. 9, C. P. 588; Otis v. Adams (1893), 56 N. J. L. 38;
Gerli v. Poidebard Silk Co. (1895), 57 N. J. L. 29o; Armstrong v. St. Paul
Iron Co. (,891), 48 Minn. 1i3; Forsyth v. North Am. Oil Co. (1866), 53
Pa. z68.
2See Forsyth v. North Am. Oil Co. (1866), 53 Pa. 168, and other cases
cited above.
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must be regarded as a waiver of the right to repudiate and an
election to treat the contract as still subsisting.!
UnapportionedContracts.-Of this class of contracts, comparatively little need be said. In the case of a contract consisting of a single promise for a single consideration, the two
engagements are now generally, though not invariably, construed as dependent, so that a breach by one party excuses
performance by the other.2 In the case of an engagement
consisting of several items, given for an unapportioned consideration, a breach of a single item must be followed by the
same result. This for two reasons-first, because it is impossible to separate the portion of the consideration given for
the broken item from the portion given for the other items;
and second, because the fact that the consideration was not
apportioned by the parties to the several items is evidence
that they regarded the performance of each and all of the
items as essential to the contract. The first of these reasons,
although undoubtedly sufficient and indeed the one commonly
given, is open to criticism in that it tends to convey the
impression that if, conversely, the consideration for the several
items be apportioned, the party suffering from the breach is
confined to his remedy in damages. This, of course, is not
true. The second bedson accords perfectly with the general
principle governin'' 'conditions and warranties,, and would
therefore seem to be the more satisfactory.
The most interesting and perhaps the most difficult cases
of unapportioned contract are those in which the contract is
one for the construction of buildings, roads or public works,
the contractor to be 1jaid in fixed instalments at stated points
in the progress'of the work. These contracts have in some
instances been regarded as apportioned and decided upon the
authority of-cas'e of that "class. This is true, for example, of
the case of Bennett v. Shaug-hnessy (1889), 6 Utah 273.
There, the contract was-O6ne whereby the plaintiff agreed to
excavate a tunnel tweiv8 hundred feet in length along the
ISee also Clark v. Wheeling Steel Works (1893), 3 U. S. App. 358;
Bollman v. Burt (1883), 61 Md. 415; Scott v. Kittanning Coal Co. (1879),
89 Pa. 23r.
2Anson on Contracts (Huffcut's ed.), p. 362.
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vein of certain mining properties of the defendants and to run
cross-cuts across the vein at intervals of one hundred feet, the.
work to be paid for at the rate of twelve dollars per lineal foot for
the tunnel and six dollars per foot for cross-cuts. The defendants agreed to pay one thousand dollars on the completion of
each one hundred feet of the tunnel, and the balance (two dollars
per foot) upon the completion of the entire tunnel; and further to
pay five dollars per foot for running the cross-cuts at the time
of completing each, and the balance (one dollar per foot) at
the completion of the contract. The defendants failed to pay
the second instalment of one thousand dollars when due, and
plaintiff abandoned the work and brought action to recover
for work already done and for materials furnished. The court
held, and we believe rightly, that the failure to make partial
payment at the time stipulated justified the plaintiff in repudiating the contract. But in the opinion of the court, no distinction is drawn between contracts of this kind and instalment
contracts of sale, and the decision appears to rest, at least in
part, upon the authority of Norrington v. Might' and Revbold v. Voorhees,2 both of which, as will be seen, are cases of
apportioned contracts.
According to the better view, and that which has perhaps been
more generally accepted, these so-called construction contracts
are ordinarily unapportioned. In nearly all of them, as in that
discussed above, the instalments are not in proportion to the
work done, a part of the consideration being withheld until
the completion of all the work contracted to be performed. It
follows that each instalment is not intended to be in payment
of any particular portion of the work, but "merely an advance
of part payment for the whole, made for the contractor's convenience."3
The distinction, however, is really of little moment, for
whether a contract of this kind be regarded as unapportioned
or apportioned, the result is the same. The vital question in
either case is, as we have tried to point out, does the breach
go to the root of the contract? A failure to pay an instal' r15

U. S. 188.

13o Pa. z16.
3 Parsons on Contracts (8th Ed.), Vol.

2,

p. 636, note.
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ment on an ordinary construction -contract unquestionably
does. Such contracts usually require a considerable period
of time and a large expenditure of money in their performance,
and it is well known to parties entering into them that the
engagement as to payment is of the first importance; that a
failure to make a single stipulated payment may seriously
embarrass the contractor, if indeed it may not actually force
him to discontinue the work. In view of these conditions, it
seems perfectly clear that in such contracts it should be presumed that the engagement to pay instalments is, in the contemplation of the parties, a term of such importance that a
failure to perform it reaches the very vitals of the contract.
So it has been held by the United States Supreme Court, in
Canal Company v. Gordon (I869), 6 Wall. 561, where the
contract was for the construction of a canal. By the terms of
the contract, the contractors were to receive monthly payments
in a specified way as the work progressed, and it was expressly
provided that in case of failure of such partial payments the
same should draw interest at a specified rate. Notwithstanding this provision as to interest on delayed payments, the
court decided, apparently without hesitation, that a default in
payment of one monthly instalment of $20,000 justified an
abandonment of work, and entitled the contractors to
recover a fair compensation for all work done up to the time
of quitting. Many similar cases have arisen in the State
courts, and the decisions, so far as known, are uniformly to
the same effect.1
It should be noticed, in passing, that a construction or building contract may, by. reason of some peculiarity, present an
1
Bennett v. Shaughnessy (1889), 6 Utah 273; CoX v. McLaughlin
(188o), 54 Cal. 6o5; Grafl v. Cunningham (I888), iog N. Y. 369; Thomas
v. Stewart (1892), 132 N. Y. 580; Strack v. Hurd (1891), 41 N. Y. S. R.
777:. Preble v. Bottom (1855), 27 Vt. 249; McCullough v. Baker (1871),
47 Mo. 401; Bean v. Miller (I879), 69 Mo. 384; Mugan v. Regan (1892),
48 Mo. App. 461; Dobbins v. Higgins (1875), 78 IlI. 44o; Geary v. Bangs
(I89o), 37 Ill. App. 301; Shulte v. Hennespy (1875), 40 Iowa 352; Phil-

lips &c. Co. v. Seyinbdr (1875), 91 U.

,*46: See note i- 3 o L. R. A. at

p. 67. Although the- istinction is not cledrly drawn, the failure to pay
would seem, in some of the cases cited, to have amounted to a renunciation.
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aspect entirely different from that of the contracts in the cases
we have considered. An illustration of this is found in the
case of Broxton v. Nelson (1898), 103 Ga. 327, where the contract was to construct not one but four houses, the owner
agreeing to pay the contractor $380 for the first house, $407
for the second, $476 for the third and $380 for the fourth, "a
total of $1,643 for the four houses." Of course this is an
apportioned contract, and is analogous in principle to contracts
for the sale of goods by instalment, to be hereinafter discussed
ApportionedContracts.-Thereis a great variety of contracts
belonging to this class. Perhaps the clearest type is found in
the familiar mercantile contract for the sale of goods, in which
it is provided that deliveries and payments are to be made in
It is to these, therefore,
stated and apportioned instalments.
that our attention shall be devoted.
Of the English cases, there are four of particular prominence. In the leading one of Hoare v. Rennie (I859), 5 H. &
N. 19, the contract was one for the sale of six Ihundred and
sixty-seven tons of bar iron to be shipped from Sweden in
June, July, August and September, and in about equal portions each month, at a certain price payable on delivery. The
June shipment made by the seller was of only twenty tons,
and the court held that the failure to ship about one quarter
of the iron, as agreed, justified the buyer in refusing to receive
the twenty tons shipped and excused him from the obligation
to accept the residue of the iron. In the second case, Simpson
v. Cr2oppin (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 14, under a contract to supply
from six thousand to eight thousand tons of coal to be taken by
the buyer's wagons from the seller's colliery in equal monthly
quantities for twelve months, the buyers sent wagons for only
one hundred and fifty tons during the first months, and it was
held that such failure on the part of the buyer did not give the
seller the right to repudiate the entire contract. In the third
case, Honck v. Muller (I88i), L. R. 7, Q. B. D. 92, under a
I In Broxton v. Nelson (1898), 1O3 Ga. 327, the contract referred to
But see Barnard v. McLeod (Mich.)
in the text is said to be "entire."
72 N. W. Rep. 24, in which a similar contract appears to be regarded as
"severable."

10
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sale of two thousand tons of pig iron, to be delivered to the
buyer free on board "in November, or equally over November, December and January next," the buyer failed take any
iron in November and it was held that such failure justified
the seller in repudiating the contract and refusing to make any
subsequent delivery. In the fourth case, Mersey Co., v. Naylor
(1884), L. R. 9, App. Cas. 434, the contract was for the sale of
five thousand tons of steel to be delivered in monthly instalments of one thousand tons, and the buyers, acting under the
erroneous advice of their solicitors, defaulted in the payment
for one instalment when due. The court held that such failure to make payment for one instalment did not excuse the
seller from proceeding with the delivery of subsequent instalments.
This last-mentioned case is one of great importance, and its
doctrine seems to the writer to have been comnionly misunderstood. Thus, upon its authority, the English rule has been
said to be that a breach of an instalment contract does not
excuse performance by the party not'in fault, unless such
breach is accompanied by conduct amounting to a renunciation. 1 And in support of this conclusion is quoted the language of Lord Chancellor Selbourne, "You must look at
the actual circumstandes of the case in order to see whether
the one party to the contract is relieved from its future performance by the conduct of the other; you must examine
what that conduct is, so as to see whether it amounts to a
renunciation, to an absolute refusal to perform the contract,
such as would amount to a rescission if he had the power to
rescind, and whether the other party may accept it as a reason
for not performing his part." Considered apart from its context, this language certainly sustains the conclusion stated
above. But the Lord Chancellor continues, "I think that
nothing more is necessary in the present case than to look at
the conduct of the parties and see whether anything of that
kind has taken place;here. Before doing so, however, I must
say ,o!e or two worcs in order to show why I cannot adopt
See Burdick on Sales, p. r45; Blackburn v. Reilly (1885), 47 N.J. L.,
290.

' PP.438-9

.
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Mr. Cohen's (of counsel) argument, as far as it represented
the payments by respondents for the iron delivered as in this
case a condition precedent, and coming within the rules of
law applicable to conditions precedent. If it were so, of
course there would be an end of the case, but to me it is plain
beyond the possibility of controversy, that upon the proper
construction of this contract it is not and cannot be a condiBut, quite consistently with that
tin precedent ........
view, it appears to me, according to the authorities and according to sound reason and principle, that the parties might have
so conducted themselves as to release each other from the
contract, and that one party might have so conducted himself
as to leave it at the option of the other party to relieve himself from a future performance of the contract." That is to
say, a party may be excused from the further performance of
his engagement, either by a breach of a condition precedentan essential term-by the other party, or by the breach of a
non-essential term under circumstances indicating a renunciation ; and since in this case it is clear that the breach was not
of an essential term, the question is : was there a refusal to
perform amounting to a renunciation? This, then, we apprehend to be the true doctrine of the case, that a mere failure
to pay for an instalment of goods when due, is not a breach
of a vital term of the contract, and therefore does not excuse
further performance by the other party unless such failure to
pay is accompanied by conduct amounting to a renunciation
of the entire contract. Such is clearly the import of Lord
Blackburn's opinion,' and the rather indefinite opinions of
Lord Watson 2 and Lord Bramwell, 3 at least contain nothing
to the contrary.
In view of these four leading cases, what may be said to be
the law in England to-day? Applying the generally accepted
classification, it appears that in two cases instalment contracts
of sale are held to be entire, while in two other cases they are
held to be divisible. Consequently, it has oommonly been
thought that the decisions discussed are hopelessly in conflict
IP. 442.
P. 445.
3P. 446.

12
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Indeed, in Honck v. Miller,1 the judges themselves declare
that they are unable to reconcile Hoare v. Rennie 2 with Simpson v. Czp)pin, 3 and- the same difficulty seems to have been
experienced by Mr. Justice Gray in the leading American case
of Norrington v. Wright.4 Under the application of the suggestions set forth in the first part of this paper, however, the
confusion seems almost entirely to disappear. In all of the
cases discussed, the contracts in question fall into the class of
apportioned contracts, and inquiring in each case whether or
not there was a vital breach of the contract, it is found that the
English courts have determined that in the absence of evidence showing a different intention a failure to deliver an
instalment goes to the essence, while a failure to pay for an
instalment does not. The only real conflict is as to whether
a failure to take away an instalment is a breach going to the
essence of the contract, Simson v. Crippin' holding that it
does not, and Honck v. Muller6 holding that it does. And
since the latter is the more recent case, it would seem that it
must be regarded as overruling the former. That such was in
fact considered to be the effect of the decision is evidenced by
the opinions of Lord Justices Baggallay and Brett, 7 as well as
by the circumstance that Simpson v. Crij/n 8 is entirely
ignored by the judges in Mersey v. Nayor.9
Turning to the decisions in this country, it is found that as
in England the existing confusion may be materially diminished by disregarding all attempted distinctions between entire
and divisible contracts. With regard to a default in the
engagement to deliver instalments, it is almost uniformly
held, in accord with the English rule, that such a breach goes
to the very life of the contract; that in the absence of evidence
1L. R. 7.Q. B. D. 92 (1881).
5 H. N. 19 (8,59).

2L. R. 8 Q. B. 14 (I87t).
115 U. S. I88 (I885). f
L. R. 8 Q.B. 14 (1872).;
614. R. 7 Q. B. D. 92 (18815.

7 pP. lo-5.

'

..

8L. R. 8 Q. B. 14 (1872).

L. R. 9 App. Cas. 434 (1884).
(1878), 12 R. L 82, at p. go.

See also King Philip Mills v. Slater
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to the contrary it is'to be presumed that the parties to a contract for the sale of goods by instalments contemplate the
delivery of each instalment according to agreement as a condition precedent to further performance, and consequently that
a failure so to deliver gives to the party not in fault the right
of repudiating the entire contract. I
The leading case of Norrington v. Wright2 is a familiar one.
The contract involved was for the sale of five thousand iron
rails to be shipped at the rate of about one thousand per
month. Only four hundred rails were shipped during the first
month, and upon discovery of that fact the buyer notified the
seller that he would refuse to accept any further shipments.
In an action for breach of the contract by the seller, the
Supreme Court sustained the position of the buyer, Mr. Justice Gray reviewing the English authorities and pointing out
with perspicuity that in contracts of merchants time is of the
essence; that a statement as to time of shipment should be
regarded as a condition precedent upon the non-performance
of which the party aggrieved may repudiate the contract; and
that "when the goods are to be shipped in certain proportions
monthly, the seller's failure to ship the required quantity in
the first month, gives the buyer the same right to rescind the
whole contract that he would have had if it had been agreed
that all the goods should be delivered at once."
There would seem to be no sound reason for distinguishing
a breach in the delivery of the first instalment, as happened
to be the case in Nortington v. Wrighzt,3 from a breach in the
delivery of any subsequent instalment, and such is the view
subsequently taken by the federal courts.' It may be well
I Norrington v. Wright (1885), IX5 U. S. 188; Creswell v. Martindale
(894), 27 U. S. App. 277; Cleveland Rolling Mill v. Rhodes (1887), 121
U. S. 255; Pope v. Porter (i886), 102 N. Y. 366; Elting v. Martin (874),
5 Daly (N. Y. C. R.), 417; King Philip Mills v. Slater (1878), 12 R. I. 82;
Johnson v. Allen (1884), 78 Ala. 387; Ballman v. Burt (1883), 6x Md. 415;
Robson v. Bohn (1880), 27 Minn. 333; Roebling v. Lock Stitch Pence Co.
(i888), 28 Ill. App. 184; Smith v. Keith, etc., Co. (x889), 36 Mo. App. 567;
Providence Coal Co. v. Coxe (1896), 19 R. I. 380.
2115 U. S. x88 (1885).
s

U.elS.

M88
(

(885).

4Creswell v). Martindale (1894),

27

U. S. App. 277.
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also to note, at this point, that not every act inconsistent with
the terms of the agreement-not every trifling departure from
the stipulations of the contract as to delivery, would reach the
essence of the contract. The breach must be material and
substantial. It must be such as to defeat the purpose of the
contract, as contemplated by the parties. Thus, in the
recent Alabama case of Worthington v. Given,1 the contract requiring the delivery, by instalments of no stipulated quantity, of ore "free from foreign substance," it was
held that the delivery of a small quantity of ore that was
not free from foreign substance did not justify a repudiation
of the-contract.
Of the small minority of cases which, dissenting from the
weight of English and American authority, hold that delivery
-- of one instalment is not a term essential to the life of the
whole contract,2 Gerli v. Poidebard Silk CO. (1895), 57 N. J.
L. 432, while not the earliest, is perhaps the chief. The contract in this case was for the sale of thirty bales of silk, deliverable ten bales July 20 to 25, ten bales August i5,and ten
bales September I to io,each instalment to be paid for sixty
days after delivery at $5.9o per pound. In consequence of
the ltateness of the crop it was impossible for the sellers to
make delivery of the first ten bales within the time specified,
and after the expiraiion of an extension of time the buyer
notified the sellers that it cancelled the contract because of
the default and would decline to receive any of the merchandise ordered. The court held that the buyer was liable in
damages for? his refusal to accept the second and third instalments, declaring that in contracts for the sale of goods, to be
executed by a series of deliveries and payments, defaults of
either party with reference to one or more of the stipulated
acts, will not discharge the other party from his obligation,
unless thi -conduct of the party in default be such as to evince
an intention to abandon the contract or a design no longer to
be bound by its terms., .. Tn connection with the case, it should
124 SO. Rep. 739 (1898).

'Blackburn v. Reilly (1885), 47 N.J. L. 290; Gerli v. Poidebard Silk
Co. (1895), 57 N. J. L. 432. And see Myer v. Wheeler (z884), 65 Iowa
390.
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be noted that one of the judges wrote a dissenting opinion of
exceptional vigor!
In some of the cases which hold that a breach as to one
instalment of a contract of sale does not affect the obligation
of the parties as to subsequent instalments, the rule is somewhat differently stated. For example, in the Iowa case of
Myer v. Wheeler,2 it is said that " rescission of a divisible contract will not be allowed for a breach thereof, unless such
breach goes to the whole consideration." This has been
thought to constitute a different doctrine from that of Gerli v.
PoidebardSilk Co.3 But it is submitted that the cases are not
properly distinguishable. It is obvious that in the case of a
contract in which the consideration is exactly apportioned
between the several items of the engagement, a breach of one
item cannot" go to the whole consideration" in the sense in
which the phrase appears to be used by the Iowa court.
Therefore, to say that repudiation will not be allowed for a
breach unless such breach goes to the whole consideration, is
in reality to say that repudiation will not be permitted in any
case of apportioned contract.
With regard to the effect of a default in the payment of an
instalment, the great preponderance of American authority,'
supports a conclusion directly opposed to that reached by the
English court in Mersey v. Naylor.5 One of the earliest cases
and one which in fact was decided long before Mersey v. Naylo, is the Pennsylvania case of Reybold v. Voorlzees (1858), 30
Pa. I i6. There, the contract was for the sale of a crop of
peaches, to be delivered from day to day and paid for at the
"Van Syckle, J., at p. 437-

265 Iowa, 390 (1884).
57 N.J. L.432 (I895). See Burdick on Sales, p. 146.
4Reybold v. Voorhees (1858), 30 Pa. 116; Rugg v. Moore (1885), 11o
Pa. 236; Gardner v. Clark (r86o), 21 N.Y. 399; Barnes v. Denslow (x89o),
3o N. Y. S. R. 315; Kokomo Co. v. Inman (1892), 134 N. Y. 92; Curtis v.
Gibney (1882), 59 Md. 131; McGrath v.Gegner (1893), 77 Md. 33x;
Branch v. Palmer (x88o), 65 Ga. 21o; DeLoast v. Smith (1889), 83 Ga.
665; Bradley v. King (1867), 44 IMI. 339; Hess v. Dawson (1894), 149 Ill.
138; Stakes v. Baars (1882), 18 Fla. 656; Palmer v. Breen (1885), 34
Minn. 39.
5

L. R. 9 App. Cas. 434 (1884).
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end of each week. The seller delivered the peaches, according to agreement, for a week, but at the end of that time
neither the buyer nor any one on his behalf appeared at the
place of delivery to pay for the peaches. On the following
Monday the buyer again failed to appear and the seller thereupon discontinued the delivery, disposing of his peaches elsewhere. The court held the buyer's conduct entirely justifiable,
Chief Justice Lowrie, without the guidance of a single authority, sensibly observing, "Neither party has any time to be
wasted by the unpunctuality of the other; and neither is
required to endure the anxiety of having his summer's success
dependent on one who is not careful of his engagement. The
success of both parties depends upon the performance of present
duty." In other words, the engagement to pay is just as
essential as the engagement to deliver, and a breach of the
one, as much as a breach of the other, goes to the existence
of the whole contract. Of course, in those jurisdictions in
which it is held that a failure to deliver a single instalment
does not affect the obligation of the contract as to subsequent
instalments, a failure to pay is governed by the same rule.
There seems to be little distinction in principle between a
contract for the sale of one kind of merchandise to be delivered and paid for in-instalments, and a contract for the sale of
several different articles or several kinds or grades of merchandise for an apportioned consideration. The rule governing such a case is very well stated in the early California case
of Nrris v.'Harris(I86o), 15 Cal. 256, in which the contract
in question was one for the sale of slaves and cattle. "A contract, made at the iarfii time, of different articles, at different
prices," says the court, "is not an entire contract (i. e. a breach
as to one article does not excuse performance as to others),
unless the taking of the whole is essential from the character
of. the property, or is made so by the agreement of the parties,
or unless it is of sucha-nattutr that a failure to obtain a part of
the articles would mateii'alii- affect the objects of the contract
and thus have influenced the sale, had such failure been anti.

p.

120.

'Otis v. Adams (1893), s6 N. J. L. 38; Blackburn v. Reilly (x885), 47
N.J. L. 290. See also Tucker v. Billings (x8i), 3 Utah 82.
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cipated." In the application of the rule to a recent case, however, we are constrained to believe that the court fell into
error. In the case referred to, Rerzog v. Purdy (1897), 119
Cal. 99,it appears that the defendant, a butcher, contracted to
sell to plaintiff all the hides, calfskins, pelts and tallow of animals to be slaughtered by him during a certain period, the rate
of compensation of each article being fixed. The plaintiff
refused to take the hides, or at least failed to take them
promptly, whereupon defendant declined to deliver the other
articles and sold them elsewhere. The court held that the
plaintiff might recover damages for failure to deliver the other
articles mentioned in the contract, declaring that there was
nothing in the case to show that the sale of one item was contingent upon the sale of the others. It would seem, on the
contrary, that the express terms of the contract are strongly
persuasive to the view that the defendant wished to dispose of
all the articles he could not use in his business by a single
contract; that a failure to dispose of some of the articles materially affected the object of the contract, and therefore, if it
had been anticipated, would have materially influenced the
terms of sale.
There are many other interesting cases of apportioned contracts, but inasmuch as the purpose of this paper is accomplished, little would be gained by the discussion of them here.
The authorities already considered seem to show clearly
that the decision of every case properly turns, not upon the
form or nature of the contract, but upon the character of the
term violated, as contemplated by the parties to the contract;
that the classification of these contracts as entire and divisible
has proved unsatisfactory and misleading; and that by avoiding the use of those terms and looking directly and solely to
the breach, much of the confusion which has been supposed
to exist disappears.
Frederic C. Woodward.

